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The development of labor management practices in the financial services sector
provides an interesting insight into how problems associated with agency issues
were overcome. Within financial institutions and other white collar occupations,
the use of internal labor markets emerged as an effective means of both
controlling and motivating employees. However such management techniques
were only effective in cases where work tasks could be internalized. The business
of some types of organizations necessitated a division of work tasks between
those undertaken within the office and those undertaken outside the office.
The management and sale of insurance products is a case in point. This paper
explores the development of processes implemented to resolve a specific type
of labor management issue, namely the control of workers under conditions of
uncertainty. Using the example of the Australian Mutual Provident (Australia’s
largest life insurer), it analyses how and why particular work relations procedures
were developed.
Employers have historically applied any one number of management approaches in
determining the employment relationship. Evaluation of these strategies provides valuable
insight into development of workplace relationships and employer contributions in
shaping the history of labor relations. The manner in which firms develop labor
management processes in pursuing particular corporate growth strategies has been
a particular focus of labor economists more so than labor historians or industrial relations
analysts. The application of economic tools of analysis provides insights into the reasons
why employers apply certain labor management strategies.1 Such tools have been applied
in a number of studies and revealed quite sophisticated labor management techniques in
evidence from an early stage of business development.2 Within white collar industries
in particular, practices that may be considered relatively modern innovations, have been in
existence for long periods of time. The use of personnel practices such as internal labor
markets and career ladders for example, were fundamental strategies adopted to solve
a number of problems faced by the firm in relation to its labor force.3
One aspect of the relationship between the firm and its labor force that has received
scant attention is the way in which workplace relations strategies evolved to monitor and
motivate in cases where the performance of the individual was not easily observable.
In white collar industries, such as banking and retailing, the internalization of work
tasks allowed monitoring systems to be developed which complemented the
organizations administrative processes.4 This was not the case where the key functions
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of the organization were split, requiring both internal and external work tasks. The
business of life insurance in Australia is a case in point. This industry, faced two differing
sets of problems arising from the sales and management of insurance products. Separate
and distinct labor markets evolved to solve these problems.
This paper explores the development of monitoring and motivating processes
implemented to resolve a specific type of labor management issue, namely the control
of workers under conditions of uncertainty. Using the example of the Australian Mutual
Provident (Australia’s largest life insurer), it analyses how and why particular work
relations procedures were developed. The focus is on the sale of insurance products and
the workforce issues created. It considers the particular case of industrial insurance as
an example of how resolutions to new labor management problems developed within
a firm. Following an investigation of various analytical frameworks, it will proceed by
establishing the background to the development of labor management policies with respect
to the sale of insurance. It will then consider the drivers for organizational change and the
manner in which labor management problems altered. Finally the solutions adopted and
the implications for the principal and agents will be analysed. The Australian Mutual
Provident (AMP) is used as a case study in this respect, although there is evidence to
suggest that the systems developed in this office were replicated in the other major life
insurance offices both in Australia and Britain.5
Frameworks of analysis
The employment relationship is characterized by a number of problems which managers
seek to address in developing work management and control strategies. These issues and
the strategies designed to overcome them can be analysed from a number of perspectives.
A labor process approach for example, assumes an inherent conflict of interest between
employers and employees. It argues that the translation of the labor resource to productive
output can only be achieved through the establishment of management control structures.6
Stephen Marglin has emphasized the link between the management structure of the firm
and the division of labor. He argued that organizational forms developed because they
provided a means of control over workers not because they were necessarily efficient.7
Harry Braverman contended that management would attempt to reduce the uncertainty
associated with the work relationship by minimizing the employees autonomy.8
Interpreting the Marxist labor process theory, he argued that there were four processes
through which employers could ensure worker compliance with management objectives.
These were separating the planning and producing of output, segmenting work tasks,
redistributing tasks between unskilled and semi-skilled labor and modernizing the
production system.9 The type of strategy implied by this analysis was that of direct
control designed to limit the discretionary power of workers through close supervision
and a reduction in responsibility.10 Andrew Friedman on the other hand, argued that
management was not restricted to one method of control. He suggested that firms may
adopt different strategies depending on their relationship with their workforce and the
different sets of skills workers may have. An alternative to direct control is ‘responsible
autonomy’ which allowed a degree of power to make changes in the production
process that would be of benefit to the firm.11 This approach recognized the value of
adaptability and creativity of the workforce which could be suppressed under a system of
direct control.12
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Richard Edwards extended the debate on the control of the labor process by
categorizing strategies into three types, simple, technical and bureaucratic.13 Simple
control emerged in competitive markets where most firms were small and management
was personalized in the sense that the entrepreneur played an important role in the
functioning of the firm. There was little structure in the manner in which the workforce
was controlled with managers applying different techniques in an idiosyncratic fashion.
The growth of firms and industry undermined the simple method of control as workplaces
and workforces expanded. The emergence of technical control linked labor management
more closely to the industrial processes of the firm. More formal control structures
emerged which related physical aspects of the production process more closely to methods
of labor control. In this sense labor management tools were similar to those direct controls
described by Friedman.14 A third method of managing the workforce evolved as large
organizations sought ways to monitor non production jobs more closely. Bureaucratic
control institutionalized hierarchical power within the firm by establishing a set of rules
and procedures through which workers’ performance was evaluated and rewarded.
An aim was to encourage loyalty and commitment amongst the workforce through
a hierarchical system that rewarded effort. The procedures which evolved however, were
largely impersonal, in which the system of established rules governed the relationship
between the worker and management. The method of control adopted depended on the
firm’s stage of development. However as industries developed unevenly it could also be
viewed as an alternative method of organization implying that a variety of control
methods could be in evidence at one particular point in time.15
Braverman, Friedman and Edwards have based their hypotheses on Marxist
foundations assuming inherent conflict between capitalist and workers. The emphasis
is on the role of technology and the development of social relations in the workplace.16
Other exponents of the conflict school, such as Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles, have
applied more traditional tools of economic analysis to explain the tensions which arise in
the employer/employee relationship. Bowles and Gintis highlight the nature of labor
exchange and the associated problems of contract enforcement.17 Labor exchange is
different to other forms of exchange in that the seller maintains a degree of control over
the service supplied and has the option of working more or less intensely depending on
their preferences. An implication of this process is that the employer will at times hire
workers whose roles are to supervise rather than produce. The challenge facing the
employer is to devise a strategy of control that minimizes the costs of wages and
supervision per unit of output. For any given amount of labor performed the employer
faces a trade off between paying higher wages and decreasing surveillance or paying
lower wages and increasing surveillance. The rationale being that an increase in wages will
increase the cost to the worker of being detected of working less intensely than required
whilst a decrease in wages will increase the incentive to work less intensely.18 The optimal
outcome for the employer will be at the point where the extra cost of supervision
is balanced by the extra benefit in terms of work intensity. A second outcome of this
conflict is that employers may also choose technologies and organizational structures that
minimize supervisory costs rather than maximize profits. Each case results in an inefficient
allocation of resources.19
A more conventional economic analysis of the employment relations focuses on the
objectives of the firm and the nature of transactions within the organization. The concerns
confronting managers in the employment relationship can be classified as agency problems.
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The principal/agent model suggests that agents (such as employees) pursue their own goals
and these do not necessarily coincide with those of the principals (the owners or managers
of the firm). Information asymmetries allow agents to act opportunistically either through
concealing information (adverse selection) or concealing their actions (moral hazard).20
The difference between the goals of principals and agents can be minimized in several
ways. Incentive and monitoring devices can be instituted or contracts that tie the interests
of management and workers formed.
The perspectives mentioned above all make a contribution to the understanding of
how and why particular management processes develop and evolve. Labor process
theorists emphasis the historical development of strategies driven by the nature of
conflict within the capitalist system The categorization of these stages of development in
the approaches of Edwards and Friedman provide useful interpretive tools for analysing
and comparing different sectors.21 Likewise Bowles and Gintis offer a more theoretical
rationale for the development of control strategies that has some similarities with more
mainstream agency theory. A major difference being that while the locus of command
rests with capital the outcome will be socially inefficient as some form of control will
always be necessary.22 Agency theory on the other hand provides insights into the
manner in which organizational structures and strategies evolve to deal with the
principal/agent problem. What is clear is that the process of resolving work relations
issues is dynamic. Different industries will have different approaches depending on how
the principal/agent problem manifests itself. The rise of ’industrial personalism’ which
involved developing a close working relationship between worker and manager was one
solution adopted in white collar occupations.23 The use of internal labor markets was
another method used to overcome the difference between principals and agents. These
strategies are predicated on the assumption that the principal is able to observe and
monitor the agent within an closed working environment (that is an office). The nature
of the agency problem and measures taken to resolve it are necessarily different in cases
where there was an open working environment. In the sale of insurance products
employee opportunism was a key issue. The potential for the agent to take advantage of
the principal in any number of ways was heightened by the necessary physical divide
between the two. Out in the field it was virtually impossible to supervise the agent to the
same extent that indoor staff could be monitored. The problem became particularly
significant with the introduction of policies for which weekly premiums were collected.
The introduction of this type of policy meant that the agent was not only a salesman for
the insurance office but also a collector of premiums. Added to the list of opportunistic
behaviour the principal had to guard against, was also the possibility of theft, fraud and
embezzlement.
In this paper the principal/agent concept is used to analyse the incentive and
monitoring devices used by the AMP to overcome the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard arising from the sale of industrial life insurance.
Background
The Australian life insurance market has been historically dominated by a small number of
mutual insurers. In Britain, major life insurers evolved as departments of composite
insurance companies selling a range of insurance products.24 The leading Australian life
insurers however, traced their foundations to co-operative values which had more
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in common with friendly societies than commercial insurers. Mutuality was a feature of the
organizational structure of leading firms in the market until the demutualization trend of
the 1990s. Mutual life offices were established as societies representing groups of
concerned citizens with a common affiliation, be it religious or philanthropic. The AMP is
an example of this.
The basis on which early mutual life offices operated was different to that of private
insurers. Although they became commercial operations, it was this mutual inheritance
which set them apart from other market participants and gave the Australian industry its
particular character. Mutual life offices were societies and each policy holder became
a member of that society. As members, they had the power to enact by-laws, elect directors
and manage the business as they saw fit. Initially profits of the business and its investment
were distributed to members in the form of bonuses paid at periodic intervals. Later
a distinction was made between participating and non participating policy holders.
The latter not being eligible to receive bonuses.
The foundation of the AMP in NSW 1849 marked the beginning of an Australian life
insurance industry however it took a further 20 years before comparable institutions
emerged in the other colonies and the industry began to grow. During the intervening
years, with limited competition, the AMP established itself as the market leader, a position
it held for over 150 years.25 By 1890 five major mutuals accounted for 88 per cent of new
policies sold and 79 per cent of industry assets.26 In comparison, the British market
was characterized by much lower levels of concentration. The largest five companies
accounted for only 35 per cent of premium income at this time.27 There was also a more
diverse mix of organizational structures amongst British life insurers with mutuals, private
and composite companies operating in the market.
The expansion of life insurance societies was associated with the need to process large
volumes of information accurately and efficiently. This led firms to develop processes to
ensure the integrity of their data. Within the organization, work functions evolved in a
similar manner to those in other financial institutions.28 Procedures were departmentalized
as much as possible, as a means of containing the volume of information processing and
checking to manageable levels. Within each department there was a hierarchy of staff
positions with senior positions overseeing junior positions. Labor management practices
evolved in line with the administrative structure that reflected that of a typical U-form
enterprise. The systems developed were very similar to that used in the banking sector.
Banks faced similar problems in processing information and developing mechanisms to
reduce opportunistic behaviour by staff.29
The organizational arrangements which evolved at the AMP were a reflection of the
way in which life insurance companies operated. In 1849 it started with a very simple
administrative structure. Operating out of rented premises the society consisted of a Board
of Directors, a company secretary and messenger. The business of insurance was
conducted by the Board, which held weekly meetings to approve policy applications and
direct the investment of funds. Initially policies were sold through advertising and through
the recruitment of agencies in local towns.30
By the 1890s the Principal Board was serviced by several sections. These were headed
by the Actuary (who was the chief executive officer), the Chief Clerk, the Accountant and
the Chief Messenger. An internal labor market emerged to support this structure. Such
a system of labor management complemented the structured administrative procedures
designed to deal with large volumes of data. Internal labor markets in life insurance firms
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and other white collar industries, such as banking, evolved to deal with specific issues
in respect to the nature of the work and employment relationships. The transaction cost
argument hypothesized by Williamson saw internal labor markets occurring because of
efficiency issues. The importance of highly specialized tasks (idiosyncratic jobs) within the
firm and the existence of ‘organizational failure’ characterized by transaction costs led it to
adopt measures that would minimize these costs.31 The failure of the external labor
market to minimize transaction costs is heightened when firm specific knowledge of labor
tasks becomes significant within the organization. This was particularly the case in the life
insurance industry where a detailed knowledge of policy provisions and data management
procedures was important to the firm.
Methods of selling life insurance also evolved as the life insurers developed their
businesses on a more commercial footing. The reliance on part time agencies proved an
ineffective way to sell insurance products. The complaint frequently made was that many
agents did not actively tout for business but waited for customers to come to them.32
The solution was to contract salesmen whose main source of income was from the sale of
life insurance policies. Travelling agents or canvassing agents, as they were known were
not considered employees of the firm but at the same time were prohibited from acting for
other insurance companies. These agents travelled the country canvassing for customers.
They were generally accompanied by a medical referee who conducted the required
health check on the potential policy holder before their application was sent to the head
office and Principal Board for approval. Agents were paid on a commission basis. The
commission system was used to overcome some of the more obvious principal/agent
problems that arose from the division between management and agent. It reduced shirking
as the remuneration of the agent was tied to the amount of business he completed. This
system of payment however, could not prevent all types of opportunistic behaviour.
The possibility of fraud or misrepresentation existed with the link between payment and
the number of policies sold. To guard against this type of behaviour the insurance office
had to devise additional methods of checks, controls and monitoring devices to protect its
interests. At the AMP, the creation of branch and district offices provided a means for
doing this. Branches of the Society were progressively divided into Districts as the business
in particular regions increased. A prime function of the district office manager was to
supervise the agent ensuring that the interests of the Society were protected. The district
manager reported to the branch manager who reported directly to the Principal Board.
In this way the Principal Board kept abreast of the performance of agents in the field.
Whilst this system did not prevent all instances of opportunistic behaviour it did provide
an information flow between management and field workers. Monitoring costs, became
part of the hidden administrative costs associated with conducting business. Avoiding
the potential damage a disreputable agent could do to the Society was considered more
important than the expenses associated with supervision.
Progressively through the 1880s and 1890s life insurers such as the AMP were
refining and developing their administrative and labor management processes. To this
point organizational development was cumulative, building on past experience. However
in the early 1900s, changing market conditions led to the adoption of a new approach to
selling insurance products. The introduction of industrial insurance brought with it a
different set of labor management issues. The manner in which these were addressed
provide an insight into the relationship between managers and workers in the financial
services sector.
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The introduction of industrial insurance
Industrial insurance began in England in the 1850s. It involved the sale of a specific type of
insurance policy for which small sums were collected weekly directly from the householder.
The policy made provision for disability, old age and death benefits. It was targeted at the
working classes who were unable to afford ordinary policies for which annual or quarterly
premiums were paid. In Britain, the Prudential Insurance Company began selling
industrial insurance in 1854, a decade later it was selling over 1500 new policies a week.33
It was the success of this line of business that saved the company from bankruptcy.
In the USA industrial insurance commenced in the 1870s and grew rapidly during the
next decade. Industrial insurance was introduced in Australia at around the same time as
in the USA. The Australian system had more in common with the British model of selling
industrial insurance than the US method.34
Initially two small life insurance offices, the Mutual Life and Citizens and the
Temperance and General were the main providers of industrial insurance. The larger life
insurers were not interested in the provision of this type of insurance, which they saw as
costly and unprofitable. This position changed towards the end of the nineteenth century.
Increased competition and falling premium income re-ignited interest in alternative
insurance markets.
The AMP experienced erratic movements in the sale of new policies and premium
income over the decade of the 1890s.35 Part of problem occurred as a result of the
widespread economic depression experienced in the colonies at the time. However there
was also a general consensus that the market for life insurance policies had reached
saturation given the country’s limited population base.36 The Principal Board expressed
concern over the trend in new business on several occasions and commissioned several
reports from the General Manager into the matter.37 By 1903 the Board resolved that the
establishment of an industrial branch was desirable. This decision had far reaching
implications for the organizational structure of the firm. It involved the creation of
a separate department that duplicated existing office systems. It also involved a new
approach to the management of field workers or insurance agents as the provision of
industrial policies brought with it different labor issues to resolve.
Agency theory provides a useful structure for analysing the problems and responses to
the labor management issues associated with the sale of industrial insurance. The existence
of information asymmetry prevents the principal or manager of the firm from determining
whether or not the agent is always acting in the interest of the organization. The problem
faced by the principal was to devise monitoring and incentive mechanisms that would
ensure the agent acted in the interest of the principal.38 In respect to the sale of industrial
insurance the nature of the work provided an environment in which there was scope for
the agent to behave opportunistically. This could occur through adverse selection
(disguising or manipulating information to their own benefit), or moral hazard (shirking
or theft).
The nature of work undertaken by industrial agents was different to that of the
ordinary canvassing agent in one critical aspect. The industrial agent not only sold policies,
he collected premiums. The role of the industrial agent was to go from door to door in an
allocated area selling policies. He would then return to that household each week to
collect premiums. In addition to the risk of adverse selection associated with the sale
of policies the principal now faced the possibility of fraud or theft. To reduce this
risk, insurance offices such as the AMP devised a series of screening, monitoring and
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incentive processes, which by their bureaucratic nature added considerably to the cost of
this form of insurance.
Screening processes
Appointment as a canvassing agent to sell industrial insurance for the AMP depended on
a four stage process with the final appointment being approved by the manager of the
industrial department. The manager was required to pay ‘due attention to the character,
sobriety and general reliability’ of the applicant.39 An initial application detailing work
experience was followed by a superintendent’s report, a medical report and the provision
of a guarantor and fidelity guarantee.
The AMP had no shortage of applications for the position of industrial agent:
however, they were quite selective in their initial selection process. Those considered for
the position were generally from middle or lower middle class backgrounds. They had
usually obtained higher levels of secondary schooling. Age was also a qualifying factor,
men over 45 were not employed, the preferred age group was between the mid
twenties and mid thirties, women were not considered until the labor shortages of the
Second World War made it a necessity. Those who had previous work experience in some
type of white collar occupation, particularly the public service or sales were preferred.40
The initial application required details on prior occupation, marital status, any
previous work done for other insurance companies and the names of three referees.
Referees were asked to make specific comments on the applicant’s employment history,
whether they were sober and temperate, whether they were addicted to horse racing or
gambling and whether they had any debts or liabilities.41 Positive statements
from both referees were critical in determining whether the applicant moved to the next
stage of the application process. This stage involved an interview and report from the
superintendent in charge of managing agents at the particular branch of the AMP.
As superintendents themselves were closely monitored and judged on the success of their
agents they were very particular about the appointments they recommended. They were
advised to choose men who were used to dealing with the public. They were instructed to
ensure that the successful applicant had ‘tact and personality’, the ‘slow moving and slow
thinking laboring type’ were considered unsuitable for the position.42 The superintendent
was also required to assess the respectability of the applicant. An example can be seen
in the superintendent’s reports on four applicants for agents’ positions in the Goulburn
district of New South Wales. Of the four, three were rejected, one on the grounds of
‘being in bad company’, another because of a bad reference and the third because he was
studying to become a teacher.43
In addition to referee and superintendents’ reports a medical examination was also
required. The applicant was obliged to detail any past medical conditions and pass an
examination from a nominated medical practitioner. Even the existence of relatively minor
ailments was sufficient grounds for non-appointment.44 Following the medical report
a further report was required from the person who agreed to act as guarantor for the
applicant. This report detailed the financial position and social reputation of the applicant.
Managers were required to personally interview guarantors to ensure the firm was able to
obtain the appropriate security. A fidelity guarantee policy of AUS£50 was originally
required but was later replaced with an internal arrangement in which the agent
contributed 10% of weekly earnings to an account set up by the office.45
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Once the applicant had passed the selection testing procedure they were appointed on
a probationary basis for six months during which time more reports were conducted.
The superintendent was required to report to the branch manager on the suitability of the
new agent in terms of his ability as a collector of premiums, how he was received by the
public, the neatness of his book work, how much new business he had written and whether
or not he was a good salesman.
This system of recruitment was the first step in addressing the problems associated with
adverse selection. It was reinforced by the existence of what was termed an ‘Enquiry List’,
which was in effect a blacklist of persons not to be employed as agents by the Society.
Each branch was required to keep a record of persons considered ‘undesirable’ for
appointment as agents. Details of the individual were to be circulated to Head Office
and other branches.46 In this way the organization maintained a record of those unsuitable
for agent positions. Checks were made of the Enquiry List before any appointment
was made.
The selection process reduced the risk of opportunism on the part of agents by ensuring
obviously unsuitable applicants were not appointed. However it was not sufficient to
guard against all types of opportunistic behaviour. In recognition of this the AMP
instituted a complex monitoring process designed to account for the agents actions on
a daily basis.
Monitoring processes
The structure of agent supervision reflected the organizational structure of the firm. When
the Industrial Department was created in 1904 it replicated the branch structure system
already in place. This structure is illustrated in Figure 1.
Within each branch, the industrial department was divided into divisions under the
control of a superintendent. The division was further divided into sections. Between two
and seven sections made up a division. Between six to eight agents were grouped into
a section. Each was managed by an assistant superintendent. Both the superintendent and
assistant superintendent were salaried employees of the AMP, agents were paid on
a commission basis and not considered employees of the firm. Superintendents were
recruited from the ranks of successful agents. Although recognized as employees of the
Society they had limited advancement prospects within it. They were not eligible to
participate in the internal promotion system that existed within the organization.
The superintendent was directly accountable to the District Manager and through him to
the Manager of the Industrial Department. A feature of the AMP’s system of control was
that although a hierarchical management structure existed, the Manager and General
Manager played a very hands-on role in the selection and monitoring of staff.
Annual performance reviews of all staff were conducted and reported to the General
Manager and Principal Board of the Society. These formed the basis of any salary
increment and could determine the future employment prospects of the employee.
Superintendents were closely monitored and failure to comply with staff regulations and
perform to set standards could result in termination of employment.
The role of the superintendent was to supervise and audit the work of the agent.
Superintendents were set an annual target in relation to policy premium income their
agents were expected to meet. They were judged on their success in controlling their
divisions and their ability to hold business.47
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The responsibilities of superintendents and assistant superintendents commenced
with the recruiting process. They were directed to ensure that their agency staff were
composed of the ‘right type of men’ and told, ‘the growler, red ragger or man with a
grievance should be quickly replaced as he cannot be enthused and spoils your influence
Principal Board 
Chief Clerk
General
Manager and
Secretary
Branch
Managers Actuary Accountant
Industrial
Department
(ID) Manager
Regional
Divisions
Superintendents
Sections
Assistant
Superintendents
State and Overseas  Branches
Ordinary Department
Managers
Industrial Department
Managers
District Office
Manager
Figure 1. AMP organizational structure 1920.
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on the remainder’.48 Upon appointment superintendents and assistants were responsible
for the training of the agent and expected to develop a close personal relationship with
them. This required working closely with the agent in the field. The superintendent was
directed to build up an ‘espirit de corps’ with his agents but not become overly familiar.
It was not permitted to allow agents to address them on a first name basis, the emphasis
was on leadership and authority as a form of control.49
Superintendents were expected to regularly accompany agents on their rounds to
‘advise’ them on their canvassing methods. The monitoring system was formalized into
a rigid set of procedures. Checks were kept of agents both by their supervisor or
superintendent and also by district and regional offices. On appointment agents were
assigned a specific canvassing area, known as their ‘debit’. They were required to canvas
and collect premiums only in this area. Within their appointed debit agents were expected
to follow a set route and order so that at any particular time, on any particular day, the
superintendent knew exactly where they were. Superintendents were directed not to
tolerate irregularities and changes in the route order.50 This method of supervision was
supplemented by the record keeping system imposed on the agent. Each agent was
required to fill out and maintain a weekly collecting book. In addition he was required to
maintain a premium receipt book that was held by the policy holder. Entries made by the
agent in the collecting book and the policy holders receipt book were cross-checked by
superintendents periodically.
The collecting book provided an easy means of keeping track of the agent as his
performance as well as recording the number of policies sold and premiums collected.
Information was recorded on the particulars of households visited, policies sold,
transferred or lapsed, and premium arrears. The collecting book was handed to the
superintendent at a weekly interview. The agent also provided a weekly premium account
that summarized the balance of the debit from the last account, the change in the renewal
debit, new premiums sold, net change in the ‘increase’ and cash collected and banked.
This account formed the basis for the book-keeping entries that comprised the office
records of the department.
The superintendent was required to provide a weekly summary of all agencies under his
control, a copy of which was sent to head office.51 In addition to tracking the weekly
performance of the agent this ledger provided the basis on which the commission payable
to the agent was calculated. Agents were paid on the basis of the ‘increase’ in premiums.
The ‘increase’ was the difference between new policies sold and policy lapses. This system
ensured that agents did not produce ‘fake’ business, that is sign up policies for which
premiums were not paid. Further checks and balances were conducted in the local office
where the records of the agent were transferred to a series of journals and ledgers
which provided a record of the business brought in by the agents in the district. The book-
keeping processes at the AMP were extensive and formed a double checking system in
which office staff reviewed the entries made by both the agent and superintendent.
Premium accounts recorded information on each agent’s ‘increase’, monthly debit returns,
collections, arrears, new business, reinstatements of lapsed policies and policy holder
addresses. These were reconciled with the cash collected accounts to ensure accuracy.
In addition the agent’s collecting book was returned to the office every six months for
auditing by office staff. Audit cards were also used to recheck the agent’s performance.
These cards recorded the due date of the last premium, which was then compared with the
agent’s receipt book.52
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The checking system within the insurance office was supplementary to that carried out
by the superintendent. In addition to the weekly review of the agent’s progress, the
superintendent was required to carry out spot audits in which he inspected the agent’s
debit without his knowledge. Agents that did not meet a minimum requirement of new
business, or were found to be unsatisfactory in other respects were asked to respond or
resign.53 Further checks were done on the general performance of agents in an annual
review conducted by the regional office. Employment records kept data on dates of
appointment and resignation as well as terms and conditions. They also included
comments from branch and regional managers on the character of the agent. These
records provided a means by which the branch and head office managers could track the
performance of agents in the field. The remarks made in these reports are indicative of
the manner in which the office perceived its relationship with agents. Comments such as
‘energetic but a complete failure as an agent’, ‘very pleasant personality – average
producer’, ‘never likely to reach great heights’, ‘a fairly successful agent but a great
drunkard’ indicate the extent to which the Society monitored the behaviour of agents.54
Those that didn’t perform to the required standard were dismissed and placed on the
Enquiry List previously mentioned.
The monitoring system was a reflection of the labor management systems implemented
within the general organization of the society. These systems evolved from the essential
nature of the work undertaken. Life insurance was an information processing industry.
Errors in the gathering, recording and processing of information had the potential to be
very damaging to life insurers whose whole business revolved around risk management.
Firms developed sophisticated measures to ensure the integrity of their information.
Methods of checking and cross-checking data were easily translated into processes that
could be used to monitor the performance of employees and agents. Within the office an
internal labor market evolved that provided the security needed to protect the interests of
the principal.55 In the field similar monitoring devices were applied to minimize the risk
of agency problems occurring. These devices, however, were not sufficient to ensure the
maximum effort from agents. The AMP soon found that other initiatives were needed to
encourage performance and improve outcomes.
The constraints placed on the agent in their work routine were considered by many to
be onerous. Regional managers were constantly complaining of the difficulty in obtaining
‘good’ men for agency work. This was reflected in the turnover rate among agents.
The average length of service in the 1930s was four years but many did not last that long.56
Forty per cent stayed less than two years.57
Resignation was one of the few ways in which agents could respond to working
conditions that they felt were not tolerable. Conditions of employment were determined by
the nature of the relationship between the firm and the canvassing agent. The Society was
determined to ensure that agents were not considered employees of the office. This
position was formalized in 1916 when the AMP agents’ agreement was altered to substitute
references to master and servant for ‘principal and agent’. The aim of this change was
specifically to place agents outside the scope of the wages system.
The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Act passed in 1904 established a federal
system of dispute resolution in Australia. This system became the primary method for
determining wages and conditions in industries that operated across State borders.
The Conciliation and Arbitration Court, the body created to implement the Act only
recognized employer associations and industrial unions registered with the Court.
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Any union of agents employed by life insurance companies had to overcome two major
hurdles before they became eligible to qualify to participate in this system and gain an
industrial award determining wages and conditions. In the first instance it had to be
established that the insurance sector was an industry within the meaning of the legislation.
The second obstacle was to establish that industrial agents were employees of life insurance
offices and could therefore apply for an industrial award determining wages and conditions.
The first hurdle was overcome in 1924 when a case brought before the Conciliation and
Arbitration Court by the Australian Insurance Staff Federation was found in their favour.58
The second impediment was not resolved until 1942 when the New South Wales Life
Assurance Field Officers Association successfully applied to register as an industrial union.
The judgement brought down by Chief Justice Piper at the time found that as agents
performed duties under the direction and supervision of the company, they were for all
intents and purposes employees of that company.59 It was only after this point that
insurance agents were brought within the scope of the federal system of wage determination.
The AMP also actively discouraged attempts at unionization among its agents. Early
agency agreements explicitly demanded that the agent should not join a union or
encourage others to do so. This clause was deleted after the 1916 decision to formalize the
principal/agent relationship that emphasized that the canvasser was an independent agent
contracted by the Society for a specific purpose.
In a later move the AMP encouraged the formation of its own house union in 1931; the
AMP Industrial Agents Association. The stated objective of this association was ‘. . . to
foster the spirit of goodwill between the AMP Society and its individual agents and
between the agents themselves’.60 This organization was a social rather than industrial
association and did not address issues that related to the terms and conditions of agent
appointments. Attempts by agents to reform the association in the light of the Conciliation
and Arbitration decision in 1942 were met with forthright action on the part of the Society.
The Society withdrew recognition of the Association’s Victorian branch and dismissed
the agents responsible for instigating the move, which would involve the two parties in an
industrial dispute. The General Manager at the time, Monty Buttfield, in an address to
agents invited them to reform the association in a way that was acceptable to the Society
and made it clear that militancy would not be tolerated.61
AMP agents, as with other life insurance agents, had no recourse to formal dispute
resolution procedures. The terms and conditions under which they worked made it
difficult to form an industrial association leaving them with little option in the manner in
which they could respond to onerous working conditions other than resignation.
Such agents left little record of their time with the Society but some indication of their
attitudes to the rigid system of monitoring can be gleaned from the reports of agents sent
by district managers to head office. Michael Burton for example was described as ‘very
poor agent and a hard man to get on with’. John Burke was ‘a fair agent with a continual
grievance, [he] could write fair business if he would leave others alone’, John Hooper was
‘troublesome’, Francis Cowie ‘a fair agent but a very cantankerous man’.62 Agents such as
these either resigned or were dismissed shortly after appointment. Even successful agents,
such as Len McLean, who spent his entire working life as an AMP representative, found
that the processes of surveillance agents were subjected to restricting.63
Turnover rates and difficulty in attracting good salesmen led to the introduction of
motivating processes that were targeted at fostering a relationship between the agent and
the Society.
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Motivating processes
From the inception of industrial insurance it was recognized by the AMP that agents
needed to be compensated for the liability they assumed in signing an agency contract.
This liability being the ongoing retention of policies sold. The agent’s commission was
based on the ‘increase’ system, namely the excess of new business receipts over lapses in
policy payments. Agents were held responsible for all policy lapses within the first five
years of sale.64 To ensure that agents had an incentive to maintain the policies they sold,
commission rates were calculated at a ‘high’ rate. At the AMP this rate was initially set at
15 times the net weekly increase. In the view of the industrial Department Manager,
H.W. Apperly, this rate was not as high as one another life insurer but together with
the reputation of the Society would be sufficient to attract good agents.65 A report
commissioned by the Victorian government in 1936 found that agents employed by the
AMP were the highest paid in the state. Average earnings of AUS£353 were well above the
basic wage of AUS£174 per annum. Maximum earnings were AUS£790 and minimum
AUS£225.66 The report also found that the greater proportion of agents opposed the
fixation of a minimum wage for the industry believing that they received adequate
remuneration for their services and that under a wage fixing system their income would be
reduced.67
In addition to the use of commission rates as an incentive to sell more business, more
sophisticated schemes designed to encourage extra effort from agents were utilized. In
doing so they implicitly gave agents a degree of autonomy to achieve the goals of the
schemes. Incentive strategies took three forms: bonuses, competitions and social
engagement. Initially agents who earned more than 2 shillings per week (Australian)
net ‘increase’ were eligible for a bonus. The bonus payable was up to 14 times the
net increase depending on the size of the debit and the condition of the account.
Bonuses were increased regularly to ensure that the incentive remained. Agents who
earned less than 2 shillings a week were penalized and their performance regarded as
unsatisfactory.68
The bonus scheme, while it lifted performance, was not sufficient to achieve the
outcomes desired by management. To complement it, a system of competitions and prizes
was devised. Competitions were held for the leading agent in each division, the agent with
the highest net increase in a given period. The number of competitions was expanded so
that for every month of the year some form of contest was in progress. They included
competitions such as the Increase Competition, the Directors Trophy, the Chairman’s
Trophy, the Elliot Challenge Shield, the Agents’ Competition, the Webber Cup as well as
State and Regional competitions. Prize nights were organized where winners were
presented with cups and trophies in recognition of their achievements.
In setting targets for bonuses and prizes agents were given a degree of freedom to
achieve them. While remaining within the bounds of the agency agreement they were free
to vary their hours of canvassing, employ sub-agents and expand the size of their debit
with the approval of the District Manager.
The competition system was also extended to superintendents and regional offices.
Superintendents were judged on their ability to retain policy income. The superintendent
with the highest average ‘increase’ per agent was rewarded with the Victory Cup.
Honour Boards for the champion salesman in each state were awarded each year to
regional offices. A ‘Millions Club’ was established for those agents who sold more than
AUS£1 million worth of policies in a given year.69
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Engaging the agent with the interests of the Society and creating bonds with other
agents was another tactic applied to motivate performance. Social gatherings in which
agents could meet others and exchange experiences were regular occurrences. Agents
received invitations to attend ‘smoke socials’ at which department managers attended and
team building exercises were conducted. A typical program included a variety of songs,
dramatic recitations and comic sketches presented by participants, together with a speech
from the general manager or regional manager. Picnics, cricket matches and other
sporting contests were also organized by the Society with the aim of promoting closer
bonds between the organization and its agents. From the 1920s an agent’s magazine
was published. The Mutual Provident Bulletin was published monthly. In addition to
detailing results of competitions, it advised on how the agent could improve his selling
techniques. It also provided anecdotes and humorous experiences by agents in the field.
It was a facility for keeping agents connected with the Society but also with other agents
in the field.
The motivation strategies implemented by the Society reveal much about its approach
to labor management. While supervision was a key concern, it was recognized that it
was not sufficient to attain the sales goals set by management. Devices for promoting
increased effort on the part of the agent had a paternalistic flavour to them reflecting the
view of the Society of its relationship with agents. While not wanting to acknowledge
them as employees, they nevertheless felt it important to reinforce their association with
the Society.
The effectiveness of monitoring and motivating processes
Fear of cheating, theft or fraud, on the part of the agent was the driving force behind the
introduction of such a rigid system of supervision. This fear outweighed concern over the
expense of maintaining such a system, it was in the view of the Society, ‘a question of
tempering expense with expediency’.70 As a strategy to minimize moral hazard the system
was very successful. The records of the industrial department point to very few cases in
which the Society was left out of pocket through the actions of the agent.71 Those
suspected of embezzlement were instantly dismissed and prosecuted through the courts.
In most cases the money taken was repaid either by the individual or their guarantor.
The AMP’s legal office actively pursued monies owing and frequently threatened legal
action against guarantors who failed to repay any debt left by the defaulting agent.72
A further check was the fidelity guarantee paid by the agent. The balance of this was
only returned 13 weeks after the agent had left the service of the Society and after any
monies due deducted. This also included deductions for policy lapses that occurred during
this time.
The conditions of employment of industrial agents led to accusations of sweating in the
1930s. The anti-sweating league in Victoria was successful in lobbying government for an
inquiry into the terms and conditions of employment. A report undertaken by the
Victorian department of finance in 1936 was followed by a Royal Commission in 1938.
Both inquiries concluded that while the average wage earned by agents was satisfactory,
there were many who earned less than the basic wage for unskilled workers.73 These agents
were ones usually employed by the newer and smaller life insurers that had become
established after the First World War.
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More serious concerns were expressed over some of the conditions under which agents
were contracted. The practice of employing agents on a trial basis without remuneration
was condemned, as was the lack of provision for sick leave and annual leave. The ‘increase’
system was criticized for the pressure it placed on agents to pursue lapsed policies or
refund commission paid on those policies.74
Despite criticism of the terms and conditions under which agents worked, the AMP
was successful in creating a strong bond between many of its agents and the firm.
Although rigid codes of behaviour were set for agents there was a strong element of
paternalism in the firm’s approach to their agency staff. It was recognized that it was in the
interests of the office to have agents ‘working contentedly’.75 Even though the agency
contract did not require it, the AMP generally made arrangements for agents who for
some reason or other were unable to work. Good agents who fell ill were often given
a retainer for the period that they were unable to work. The Society was generally
sympathetic to agents (who had proved to be reliable) in times of personal crisis.
In addition, terms and conditions offered by the AMP were as a rule, more generous than
those of other life insurers.76 This approach was appreciated by many of the long term
agents who developed a great loyalty to the Society. Agents such as Len McLean and
Ken Bennetts are examples of those that felt a strong allegiance to the Society after
positive experiences in their early careers. In the case of Bennetts it was a letter of
sympathy from the manager to his wife after the death of their child that won his fidelity.77
Approaches to social engagement reinforced the bond the firm was endeavouring to
create with agents. This was further encouraged with support for the AMP agents’
association. In addition to building bonds between agents and the office through social
activities acted as a conduit through which the Society and agents could communicate.
In bringing together its agency workforce this was an effective strategy and made a
position as an AMP agent very sought after when compared with other life offices.
Actions on the part of the principal to avoid problems associated with adverse selection
and moral hazard incurred agency costs. Monitoring expenses were an obvious cost of the
agent supervision system established by the AMP. No precise data was kept on the
breakdown of costs in the Industrial Department but costs were acknowledged to be high.
Management considered that any expense rate that was less than 40% of premium income
was economical.78 In the 1920s and 1930s the expense ratio ranged between 27 and 36% of
premium income. The high cost of providing this type of insurance was one of the factors
particularly noted by the 1938 Royal Commission as being unsatisfactory. The cost was
attributed to the practice of collecting weekly premiums and the method of organizing
agents.79 Table 1 gives some indication of the level of costs for the provision of industrial
insurance in one state – Victoria.
Twenty-three per cent of the total cost of providing industrial insurance went on the
monitoring of staff. The ratio of total expenses to revenue was 23.5%.
The expense rate is of significance because it also represented a residual or welfare loss
to other policy holders. Under the mutual form of organization participating policy
holders as members of the Society were entitled to bonuses determined by the difference
between the income and costs of the operation of the office. High expense rates in the sale
of one type of insurance obviously impacted on the bonus payable. In general,
participating policies were those sold as part of the ordinary business of the insurer.
Industrial policies tended to be non-participating meaning that the policy holder had no
right to the bonus.
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Conclusion
The AMP developed very comprehensive and complex monitoring and motivating devices
in order to resolve particular labor management issues that arose with the sale of new types
of insurance products. These processes reveal much about the way in which the firm
perceived its relationship with its agents. The Society took deliberate steps to ensure that
there was not a formal employer–employee relationship with the agent. Nevertheless
agents were treated as employees and expected to conform to a rigid set of procedures and
instructions in conducting their business.
While the focus of this paper has been on the practices of one insurance office, there is
evidence to suggest that this firm was not unique and that monitoring practices were
common in most insurance offices in Australia and Britain.80 In fact, the AMP regularly
sent its manager to investigate and report on systems used by insurance companies
overseas. Many of the reported measures were implemented.81 In Britain, the Prudential
Assurance Company, one of the first to introduce industrial insurance, had developed very
similar processes. Using a system of divisions, districts and agencies, the company
constructed methods to monitor the behaviour of its agents in very similar ways to those
employed at the AMP.82 Similar methods were used at the Royal Exchange where efforts
were also made to create a bond between the firm and agents and promote a corporate
spirit.83 Australian life insurers followed the British model in implementing their systems
of agency control.
In the USA resolution of the agency problems associated with the selling of life
insurance were approached in a different manner. As was the case in Britain and Australia,
an agency system, where agents were not considered employees of the insurance company,
was used to sell life insurance.84 The same issues that arose with this relationship in
Australia occurred in US markets. However, rather than develop bureaucratic systems of
control, the approach taken was to move towards the professionalization of the insurance
salesman. The National Association for Life Underwriters together with visionaries
such as Solomon Huebner sought to establish specialized education and training for
insurance salesmen as early as 1912. The founding of the American College of Life
Underwriters in 1927 was a first step in the formation of an accreditation process that
Table 1. AMP, Industrial Department expenses 1931.
Expenses* AUS£
Commission 188,024
Agents travel allowances 28,949
Superintendents’ salaries 71,772
Superintendents’ travel 12,767
Office staff salaries 46,906
Office travel 538
General office expenses 16,678
Total expenses 365,684
Total revenue from premiums and interest 1,552,890
Expense ratio 23.5%
Note: *Excludes management expenses.
Source: AMP Archives.
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would lead to the professional development of insurance salesmen.85 It was not until the
1950s that the Australian industry began to take steps to improve the education and
training requirements of its agents as a precursor to the professionalization of the
occupation.86
A driving force in the implementation of monitoring procedures was the fear that
agents would behave opportunistically and pursue their own interests rather than those of
the principal. This could take the form of misrepresentation, fraud or theft that might
potentially damage the reputation of the Society and the confidence policy holders placed
in it. A key problem the Society faced was in observing the behaviour of its representatives
out in the field. To avoid the risk of agent opportunism it was necessary to align the
interests of the principal and the agent as closely as possible. Monitoring mechanisms
provided a means of checking the actions of the agent, while motivating processes sought
to engage the agent and ensure the interests of both parties coincided.
Monitoring practices took several forms and were conducted in the field and within
the office. Two notable features were the way in which procedures were devised to
observe the behaviour of the agent out in the field and the manner in which checking
systems were incorporated into office processes. The agent’s working life was directed by
a series of rules and regulations which were strictly scrutinized for compliance. Office
book-keeping systems doubled as a further checking mechanism so that any irregularities
in the agent’s work could be detected. In terms or preventing opportunistic behaviour on
the part of the agent these measures were very effective. There were few recorded
instances in which the AMP was out of pocket as a result of theft or fraud on the part of
the agent.
The costs associated with this form of organization were high both in terms of the
employment of supervisory staff and the duplication of effort in the checking systems used.
This made industrial insurance one of the most costly forms of insurance to provide yet the
firm was not unduly concerned about the expense ratio. The reason for this was the much
greater concern for the reputation of the Society if policy holder confidence in the firm was
undermined through the actions of agency staff. The relationship between the insurer
and insured was based on trust. An undermining of that trust had the potential to ruin the
firm in the long term. Minimizing agency costs was a key consideration in the development
of strategies designed to supervise insurance salesmen.
The work relations processes developed by the AMP provide a number of insights into
the evolution of labor management strategies. Rather than an historic uni-directional
process involving the development organizational structures that gave the employer more
direct control over worker output, the firm utilized a number of strategies to overcome the
contradictions in the employer/employee relationship. Mutually exclusive strategies
emphasizing either direct control or, responsible autonomy were not sufficient. The
Society desired loyal, honest and dependable agents who could be relied upon to promote
the interests of the firm. At the same time it required conformity to rigid monitoring
structures designed to protect its interests against agent opportunism. The strategies
applied by the AMP contained elements of control as well as autonomy. They were driven
by the firm’s perceptions and attitudes to risk rather than cost and output. This approach
suggests changes in these perceptions would lead to alterations in labor management
strategies. Such an event did not occur until the post war period when changes to the firm–
agent relationship were associated with the adoption of modern personnel management
processes within the AMP.
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